The paper provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known su¢ cient conditions in the literature.
Introduction
Although written in the form of a book review, Bertrand's (1883) critique of Cournot's (1838) oligopoly turned out to form the most widely used model of price competition. Indeed, nowadays, the Bertrand duopoly model is one of the cornerstones of introductory microeconomics and game theory. The "Bertrand paradox" usually refers to the unusual equilibrium outcome of perfect competition in a market with just two …rms. 1 The strategies whose implementation leads to this outcome prescribe to set the minimal prices (equal to the marginal costs), resulting in zero pro…ts. The fact that such strategies form a Nash equilibrium is a simple observation, and actually does not require any assumptions on the model. However, uniqueness holds only under additional assumptions, and its proof requires some quite elementary but novel arguments.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature provides no necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. In the present note, we formulate such a condition in terms of static collusion being unsustainable, an intuitive assumption. In addition, we also provide easily veri…ed su¢ cient conditions for this key assumption in terms of standard properties of demand. This …nding seems to be the …rst result of this kind after more than a century of studies on the Bertrand duopoly model and its versions.
Owing to a number of special game-theoretic features, the classical Bertrand duopoly has generated broad interest extending far beyond oligopoly theory and modern industrial organization. The …rst feature of interest is that the Bertrand game is the oldest representative of the class of classical games with naturally discontinuous payo¤ functions. 2 In addition, the payo¤ discontinuity along the price diagonal is extreme: the low-priced …rm grabs the entire market and the rival gets nothing. 3 Another key feature of the classical 1 It is well known that the Bertrand paradox is in many ways not very robust. For the case of convex costs, see Dastidar (1995) . For the Bertrand-Edgeworth version with unequal unit costs, see Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) . For product di¤erentiation and endogenous timing, see Amir and Stepanova (2006) . 2 The payo¤ functions are not even upper semi-continuous in the prices, so the …rms'reaction curves are not well de…ned. Thus the Bertrand duopoly does not …t the usual classes of games with discontinuous payo¤s (Reny, 2016) . In addition, the payo¤s are not quasi-concave in own action, so the results from that literature do not apply. Nonetheless, an exception is Prokopovych and Yannelis (2017) , who derive a general result that includes existence in the Bertrand model as a special case. 3 As a consequence, the Bertrand game belongs to a family of games for which a tie breaking rule is a Bertrand game is that the unique Nash equilibrium is in weakly dominated strategies.
Indeed, pricing at marginal cost yields zero pro…t to the two …rms. Finally, the Nash equilibrium payo¤s correspond to the individually rational payo¤s of the …rms, or their maxmin payo¤s, which makes the in…nitely repeated version of the game a convenient and robust model for studying tacit collusion via the Folk Theorem.
A key reason the Bertrand model has generated broad interest beyond oligopoly theory is the fact that other, a priori unrelated, games in experimental economics and game theory turned out to share these properties in one form or another. These games include the Guess-The-Average game (Moulin, 1986) , which, along with various extensions, has spurned an extensive literature in experimental economics, see e.g. Nagel, Bühren, and Björn (2017) . This is a constant-sum game wherein players pick numbers in [0; 100] and the one closest to 2=3 of the average wins a …xed prize (with ties sharing the prize equally), and the others get 0. In the two-player version, 0 is also a weakly dominant strategy (Grosskopf and Nagel, 2006) . The unique Nash equilibrium, which calls for every player to pick 0, garnered little support in laboratory experiments, although play unraveled towards it. Yet, a discretized and stylized version of the Bertrand game con…rmed the usual equilibrium, more so with more than two players (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000) .
Although pertaining to a di¤erent social situation, the Traveler's Dilemma (Basu, 1994 ) has a similar structure, with the key modi…cation that the value of "undercutting the rival" is smoothed out to a small reward, in contrast to the extreme gap characterizing the other two games. Although the Nash equilibrium calls for the players to pick the lowest number and share the prize, laboratory behavior displayed signi…cant departures from this robust theoretical prediction (Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt, 1999) .
One possible implication of the present study of Bertrand duopoly is that it might shed some light towards a systematic study of the aforementioned general class of games and their variants. Another interesting implication is that the downwards monotonicity of the demand function is not relevant to the existence or uniqueness of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium (we shall return to this point below). As a …nal remark, it is worth noting that, by o¤ering a complete characterization of uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, our elementary result has no antecedents in game theory, in that uniqueness is typically guaranteed with su¢ cient conditions that are often quite far from necessary. Indeed, necessary part of the de…nition of the game, and its speci…cation is often a critical part of its solution.
uniqueness almost invariably follows from a global contraction-type argument.
The main result
We consider a version of the Bertrand duopoly model with a homogeneous product.
There are two pro…t-maximizing …rms 1 and 2 producing a homogeneous good in a market whose demand function is given by D(p) 0 (p 0). The cost, c 0, per unit produced is the same for both …rms. The …rms simultaneously set their prices p 1 and p 2 . Sales for …rm i are then given by
The …rms'pro…t functions are i (p 1 ; p 2 ) = (p i c)D i (p 1 ; p 2 ); i = 1; 2:
We assume that the …rms never set prices that are less than c: if p i < c, then …rm i cannot have a strictly positive pro…t i > 0. Thus we have a game with payo¤s
Since we consider only those prices p i that satisfy p i c, it is su¢ cient to assume that D(p) is de…ned only for p c.
We are interested in (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria of the above game (Bertrand-Nash equilibria), i.e., pairs of prices (p 1 ; p 2 ), p i c, such that 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ) 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ) and 2 (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 (p 1 ; p 2 ) for all p 1 ; p 2 c.
The next result is well-known (though note the abscence of the usual assumptions).
Theorem 1. The prices p 1 = p 2 = c form a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand game.
Proof. Since the game is symmetric, it is su¢ cient to prove that 1 (p; c) 1 (c; c) for every p c: We have 1 (c; c) = 0. If p > c, then 1 (p; c) = (p c)D 1 (p; c) = (p c) 0 = 1 (c; c), which completes the proof.
We provide a criterion for the uniqueness of equilibrium in the Bertrand duopoly model. Denote by (p) the monopoly pro…t For the uniqueness result, we shall need the following simple and intuitive condition: This condition means that, given a price p, by setting some price q = r(p) below p, the …rm can get a pro…t (q) higher than half of the monopoly pro…t at price p, i.e., (p). An interesting interpretation of this condition is that it ensures that static collusion between the two …rms in the form of equal market sharing at any price p is not sustainable, in that each …rm has a pro…table deviation q. 4 This is a very mild assumption, as will be seen through two easy-to-check su¢ cient conditions we provide for it below.
Theorem 2. Condition (D) is necessary and su¢ cient for (c; c) to be the only Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand duopoly.
Proof. Let (D) hold. Suppose there is another Nash equilibrium, (p 1 ; p 2 ), p i c, distinct from (c; c). We may assume without loss of generality that p 1 p 2 (one can always swap p 1 and p 2 ).
We consider three cases, in all of which we arrive at a contradiction with the assumption that (p 1 ; p 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium.
1st case: c < p 1 < p 2 . Observe that D(p 1 ) > 0. Indeed, if D(p 1 ) = 0, then …rm 1 can replace the price p 1 by the price q = r(p 1 ) < p 1 described in (D), which will lead to a strict increase in its pro…t (q c)D(q) > (p 1 c)D(p 1 )=2 = 0:
But this is impossible as long as (p 1 ; p 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Here the pro…t of …rm 2 is zero (since p 1 < p 2 ). Therefore by setting the price p 1 instead of p 2 , it can get a strictly positive pro…t 2 (p 1 ; p 1 ) = (p 1 c)D(p 1 )=2 > 0:
Consequently, (p 1 ; p 2 ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
2nd case: c = p 1 < p 2 . Then …rm 1's pro…t is zero, and it can obtain, by setting instead of the price p 1 = c the price q = r(p 2 ) < p 2 (see condition (D)), a strictly positive pro…t:
is not a Nash equilibrium.
3rd case: c < p 1 = p 2 . By virtue of (D), there exists a price q = r(p 1 ) < p 1 such that
This means that …rm 1 can increase its pro…t by charging the price q instead of p 1 , which contradicts the assumption that (p 1 ; p 2 ) is Nash equilibrium.
Thus we have proved that condition (D) is su¢ cient for the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in Bertrand duopoly. Let us prove that this condition is also necessary. Suppose (D) does not hold. This means that for some p > c, the inequality
is satis…ed for all c < q < p. We claim that ( p; p) is a Nash equilibrium, i.e., each …rm, deviating unilaterally from p cannot strictly increase its pro…t. Indeed, if it sets a price q > p, then its pro…t is zero. If it sets a price c < q < p, its pro…t cannot be greater than ( p c)D( p)=2 by virtue of (1), and the same is true of course if q = c.
The proof is complete.
Su¢ cient conditions
We now provide familiar su¢ cient conditions on the demand function for the uniqueness of a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. 5 Consider the following alternative assumptions:
(D1) The function D(p) is continuous on [c; 1), and D(c) > 0.
(D2) The function D(p) is non-increasing on [c; 1), and there exists p > c such that
In most textbook treatments of Bertrand duopoly, (D1) and (D2) are assumed together, along with the presence of a choke-o¤ price p 0 such that D(p 0 ) = 0 (Mas-Colell et. al. 1995, p. 388) . In textbooks on industrial organization, these assumptions are often not explicitly listed, but one can infer from the context that the tacit assumptions on demand are the same: continuity and downward-monotonicity (Tirole, 1988) .
We now show that either of (D1) and (D2) is su¢ cient for our assumption (D) to hold. The proof is complete.
It is worth recalling that industrial organization deviated from standard microeconomics early on by postulating a downward-sloping demand as a primitive. To ensure that a demand function derived from the maximization of a utility (subject to a budget constraint) is decreasing, one needs the somewhat restrictive assumption of a quasi-linear utility in a numeraire good (e.g., Amir et. al, 2017 or Vives, 2000 . Alternative approaches in microeconomics that were not adopted in industrial organization include the theory of demand aggregation (Grandmont, 1992 and Hildenbrand, 1994) , a Marshallian notion of small income e¤ects (Vives, 1987) , and imposing restrictive su¢ cient conditions on the standard consumer problem (e.g., Quah, 2007) . Given this dichotomy between industrial organization and the broader microeconomics …eld, there is some theoretical motivation for developing results in oligopoly theory that do not rely on a downward-sloping demand as a primitive. The present note may thus be seen as a step in this direction.
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